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1 Introduction
Over the last several decades, empirical analysis in virtually all of finance as well as a large 
part of macroeconomics has been based on the assumption of a Rational Expectations 
Equilibrium (REE). There, rational expectations are primarily understood to imply that 
investors' beliefs are correct. 1 This means that agents are able to weigh potential future 
outcomes using probabilities that reflect the frequencies with which these factually will 
occur. In other words, their priors coincide with the true probability measure. Rational 
expectations do not necessarily imply that investors have perfect foresight. However, 
to the extent that future events are uncertain, investors correctly infer the necessary 
information from signals (including prices in the market), applying the rules of conditional 
probability (Bayes' law). 
The correctness of beliefs in the finance/macro definition of rational expectations is 
not crucial for many theoretical insights, such as the Euler equation restrictions obtained 
in Lucas [1978], the existence of an equivalent martingale measure shown in Harrison and 
Kreps [1979], or the dealer market pricing equations of Kyle [1985] . These continue to 
hold even if we allow for biases in investors' beliefs: But expectations must then be taken 
with respect to agents' subjective beliefs instead of the "true probability measure." 
Instead, the attraction of the rational expectations assumption is exclusively empir­
ical. It facilitates estimation and testing of asset pricing models, because agents' beliefs 
can readily be obtained from the empirical distribution. Parsimonious model testing 
ensues, as exemplified by Hansen and Singleton [1982] . Rational expectations is further 
motivated by the fear that the possibility of biases in beliefs would require the empiricist 
*We thank Tom Rietz for sending us price and volume series from the!owa; Experimental Market.
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1There is a micro-theoretic literature on rational expectations, which does not necessarily imply cor­
rectness of beliefs. See Radner [1967], Green [1973]. Here, we refer to the concept of a Dynamic Rational 
Expectations Equilibrium, as originally defined in Lucas [1972], [1978], where beliefs are explicitly as­
sumed to be correct. This concept seems to have gotten its inspiration from the vaguer idea of an 
informationally efficient market in finance (Fama [1970], [1991]). See also Muth [1962]. 
to be much more specific about the economy, and, in particular, about learning, with 
the consequent danger that asset pricing models may be rejected because the evolution 
of beliefs was misspecified. 
Still, the assumption of rational expectations has been criticized as unrealistic. Pro­
ponents defend it as the adequate long-run description of an economy by pointing out
that rational expectations can be acquired by learning. Of course, ·this does not provide 
sufficient ground to ignore the initial biases in beliefs and potentially transient learning 
in tests of asset pricing models. For instance, Bossaerts [1995] proves analytically how 
standard rational expectations test are affected even asymptotically by initial biases and 
transient learning. That article also illustrates the fragility of the asymptotic distribu­
tional properties of test statistics as one alters the specification of beliefs and beliefs 
updating. 
The necessity of specifying the learning environment when one deviates from REE 
was, however, recently challenged in Bossaerts [1996] . That paper derives a set of mar­
tingale restrictions on securities prices that neither depend on the priors nor on the 
likelihood function. One of the securities considered in Bossaerts [1996] was of the sim­
ple Arrow-Debreu type: it pays one dollar in one state of the world, and zero in all 
others. Markets were assumed to be populated with risk-neutral agents endowed with 
unknown priors. These agents, however, used Bayes' law to infer the actual state from 
sequences of signals. To reflect the close relationship with the game-theoretic literature 
(in particular, Harsanyi [1976]) ,  let us refer to the ensuing equilibrium as the Bayesian 
Equilibrium (BE). 
The purpose of the present paper is to illustrate how the theoretical results in Boss­
aerts [1996] can be implemented to test for BE against the more restrictive traditional 
REE. In the absence of an explicit specification of priors and likelihood functions, we 
only test the central part of a Bayesian Equilibrium, namely investor's usage of Bayes' 
law to update beliefs. Since Bayesian updating is rational in the sense that it implies 
that the agent cannot forecast where her beliefs will go next, we effectively study the 
rationality of updating. This contrasts with tests of REE, where one requires not only 
rational updating, but also correct priors. 
We investigate the pricing of "winner take all" contracts traded in the computerized 
experimental markets developed at the University of Iowa. Winner-take-all contracts are 
simple examples of Arrow-Debreu securities: they pay $1 in one state of the world; $0 in 
all others. We study the contracts which derive their payoff from price changes of stocks 
in the computer indus_try and the S&P500 index. 
Our focusing on experimental markets should be attributed to the absence of real 
markets with Arrow-Debreu securities. Still, one could imply synthetic Arrow-Debreu 
securities prices from the prices of widely traded put and call option contracts. Our 
restrictions could be tested on these synthetic prices. See Bondarenko [1996] for an 
application to S&P500 index options. An alternative would be to directly study put and 
call prices: Bossaerts [1996] derived restrictions on their prices as well. A disadvantage 
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is that these restrictions are more involved and less intuitive. 
We find that prices in the Iowa markets reflect rational learning. Evidence against 
rational expectations surfaces, however, indicating that investors may have started with 
biased priors. Among other things, there is a pronounced negative correlation between 
the price level and the subsequent price change. This finding is not unlike the evidence· 
from stock markets (e.g. , Keim and Stambaugh [1986] ) .  
. 
It deserves emphasis that the latter does not necessarily imply that there is money 
to be made. The priors of participants in the Iowa markets are as good as any other. An 
outsider may have different priors, but whether this would lead her to "make money" 
depends on the circumstances. She would if her priors happened to be better (this is 
a chance event). Her trading would amount to pure speculation, because our results 
indicate that participants in the Iowa market certainly do not leave "money on the 
table" because they do not know how to correctly update their beliefs (they could be 
over-reacting or under-reacting to new information). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section explains the 
theory with the help of a simple example. Section 3 describes the Iowa experimental 
markets that are the focus of the study. Section 4 presents the results of the tests of the 
rationality of learning. Section 5 inv:estigates rational expectations. Section 6 concludes. 
2 The Theory By Example 
Consider a world in which a state variable, e, can take on two values: 7J or fl_. Securities 
are traded and markets clear at two discrete points in time, indexed t = 1, 2. Consider 
an Arrow-Debreu security which pays off at t = 3, $1 if e = 7J and zero otherwise. Risk­
neutral investors do not' know e before the end of the second period, i.e. , before time 
t = 3. At time t = 2, however, they do receive a signals, which they use to update their 
beliefs about the value of B. The equilibrium price at time t is denoted Pt· 
For the moment, we are going to assume that agents have rational expectations. In 
other words, they know the true probability measure P which determines the relative 
frequency with which signals and states are drawn. They will use this probability measure 
to infer from the signals whether e = 7J or not. 
The first price, p1, will be set to equal the unconditional probability (prior) that B 
= 7J. Mathematicaily, 
PI= P{B = 7J}. 
The signal at t = 2, s, is determined as follows. If e = 7J then: 
_ { 1 with P = .! 
8 - 0 with P -I 2 
3 
(1) 
In contrast, if e =fl, 
s= { � with P = .!. with P = � 3 
Setting P{B = B} =�' we get: 1 
P1 = 4· 
Letting l(slB) denote the likelihood of s given 8, Eqns. (1) and (2) imply .that: 
l (l JO) 
Z (l lfl) 
Z (OJB) 
Z (Olfl) 
1 
-
2 
1 
-
3 
1 
-
2 
2 
3 
Because Pl equals the prior that e = B, we conclude: if s = 1, 
P2 
ifs= 0: 
P2 
Z (llB)p1 + Z (llfl) (l -P1) 
11 24 
.!..!.+.!.� 24 34 
1 
3' 
Z (OIB)p1 + Z (Olfl) (l -P1) 
11 
24 
.!..!. + �� 24 34 
1 
5 
We can use this to derive several results. 
Result 1: Consider the expected time-2 price: 
1 1 
3P{s = 1} + 5P{s = O} 
1 3  15  
38+58 
1 
4 
Pl· 
4 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
Consequently, 
where 
P2 -pi r2 = P1 
(6) 
the traditional return measure. Eqn. (6) states that the return is unpredictable. More 
generally, the return sequence will form a martingale difference sequence. This, of course, 
is an old resu)t, which goes back to Samuelson [1964]. 
Result 2: We now take the point of view of an econometrician contemplating a single 
price sequence. In this sequence, B remains fixed. We assume that the econometrician 
observes the price history after time t = 3, so that she knows the value of B. In that case, 
the expectation in (6) is of little relevance. Instead, we need to study E[r2 IB], i.e., the 
expectation conditional on the value that B takes on in the particular sequence at hand. 
Let us consider the case where the security matures in the money, i.e., B = 7J. Compute: 
Hence, 
1 - 1 -
3P{s = llB} + 5P{s = OIB} 
1 1  1 1  
32+52 
4 
15 
> Pl· 
(7) 
In words: there is an upward drift in prices. Of course, this is not surprising, because 
the econometrician picked a sequence of prices for a security that she knows matured in 
the money. If she had picked a security that had matured out of the money, she would 
have observed a negative drift. 
Result 3: Is there a simple way to correct for the upward drift in (7)? Consider the 
conditional expectation of the inverse of the price at time 2: 
E[_!._17J] P2 
Hence, defining 
we conclude: 
3P{ s = 1 17f} + 5P{s = Oi7J} 
1 1 3- +5-
4 
2 2 
.. _l 
P1 
P2 - P1 X2 = P2 
E[x 2 l7f] = 0. 
5 
(8) 
(9) 
In words: modifying the return by taking as basis not the past price but the future price 
makes it unpredictable! 
The martingale difference result in (9) is very general. It does not depend on the 
likelihood function; it solely follows from investors' using Bayes' law to update their 
beliefs. Over time, signals can be dependent. See Bossaerts [1996] for details and a 
general proof. Intuitively, the result obtains from taking the future price as basis to 
compute a return, which cancels the drift in (7) . The latter equation effectively implies 
that the new basis for the return measure, the future price, is higher on average than the 
old basis, the past price. 
We are now going to relax the assumption of rational expectations. Investors no 
longer are required to use the "true" probability measure P. Instead, they use another 
measure, P*, which is related to P, as follows. Factor P into a measure µ over the 
possible values of the state variable e and a conditional measure Po which determines 
the likelihood of signal outcomes conditional on e (the likelihood functions in the above 
example are derived from Po). Likewise, factor P* into a prior Ao over the state variable, 
and a conditional measure Po over the signal sequence. Notice that we constrain the 
signal likelihoods to be the same under both P and P*. The priors, however, may differ: 
Nature uses µto draw O; agents posit A0. 
Consider the specific case where P*{O = B} = �· Nature continues to �raw e according 
to the old law, which assigns only probability � to the event {e = O}. Apparently, 
investors are too optimistic. From the specification of beliefs, we conclude: 
1 
P1 = 2· (10) 
Also, ifs = 1, then computations that are analogous to those for the rational expectations 
case reveal: 
P2 
ifs= 0, 
P2 
l (llO)p1 + l (llft) (l -P1 ) 
1 1  22 
ll + ll 2 2  32 
3 
-· 
5' 
l (OIO)p1 + l (Olft) (l -P1 ) 
1 1  22 
ll + �l 2 2  32 
3 
7 
6 
(11) 
(12) 
Let us now reconsider the conditional expectations in Results 1 to 3. We continue to 
compute them under the probability measure P, which is the one that governs the data 
as observed by the econometrician. In other words, P is the measure that determines 
the. behavior of statistics that the econometrician may want to compute. 
Result 4: Taking expectations, 
3 3 
5P{s = 1} + 7P{s = O} 
3 3 3 5 
53+73 
69 
140 
< Pl· 
Consequently, 
(13) 
Unlike Result 1, however, Eqn. (13) is not robust. By changing the prior Ao, we can easily 
overturn it. In our numerical example, investors are too optimistic about the likelihood 
of 71; in other words, they overestimate the probability that the Arrow-Debreu security 
will mature in-the-money. Had we taken them to be more pessimistic, by assuming, for 
instance, that P* { e = 71} = �, the inequality would have been reversed. 
Result 5: Now augment the information with the knowledge that e = 71: 
Hence, 
3 - 3 -
5P{s = l!B} + 7P{s = O!B} 
3 1  3 1  
52 + 72 
72 
140 
> P1· 
(14) 
This result may not seem to be robust either, in the sense that it can be overturned by 
changing the prior Ao. This is not true; we come back to this point shortly. 
Result 6: Recompute the conditional expectation of the inverse price: 
E[�i7J] 
P2 
5 - 7 -
3P{s = llB} + 3P{s = OIB} 
5 1  7 1  
32+32 
2 
1 
P1 
7 
Again modifying the return by taking the future price as basis: 
we obtain: 
P2 -pi X2 = ' 
P2 
(15) 
The martingale property of the modified return has been unaffected by our relaxing the 
assumption of rational expectations! 
It is proved in Bossaerts [ 1996) that the last result is robust. It does not depend on 
agents' priors. It is merely a consequence of investors' using Bayes' law to update their 
beliefs. This is remarkable in view of the many instances in which the conclusion from 
Bayesian analysis are sensitive to the specification of the prior. 
Since the modified return of "winning securities" is a martingale difference sequence, 
the traditional return must have a positive expectation when conditioning on the outcome 
as well. This follows readily from Jensen's inequality (which is strict because the signal 
is nontrivial) : 
> 
E[ 1 - lJB] 1- X2 
1 ----- 1 1- E[x2JB] 
0. 
Hence, Result 5 is robust. It holds regardless of the prior. 
The above results have many implications. With respect to Arrow-Debreu securities, 
further developments can also be found in Bondarenko [ 1996]. In the present paper, we 
focus on the analysis of a cross-section of independent price sequences. In conjunction 
with such a dataset, the above results can be used to distinguish between the traditional 
REE and the more general BE. Under the latter, priors can be arbitrary. Under REE, 
Result 1 can be verified in a cross-section of random histories of prices of Arrow-Debreu 
securities. If the property in ( 6) is rejected, rational expectations must be rejected 
as well.2 That would not reject rationality, however. Agents could have started with 
biased beliefs. For rationality, they need only to apply correctly the rules of conditional 
probability. That is the core of the more general class of Bayesian Equilibria. In those, 
a martingale result holds only for the modified return of securities that matured in the 
money. This is the content of Results 4 to 6 . . A cross-section of price histories of "winning" 
Arrow-Debreu securities would allow us to test the proposition that investors' learning 
is rational. This will be the subject of the subsequent empirical investigation. 
20f course, there is still the possibility that agents are risk averse, unlike what we have been assuming. 
The stakes in the markets we investigate in the subsequent sections, however, are small. Risk premia, 
which are of second order anyway, are unlikely to play an important role. Incidentally, discounting could 
not play a role either: the one-dollar riskfree security in the Iowa markets continuously sells for one 
dollar, implying that it bears a zero interest rate. 
. .. 
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3 The Iowa Experimental Market 
The College of Business Administration at the University of Iowa runs a number of 
markets in winner-take-all contracts based on the returns or prices of U.S. stock exchange 
listed securities and indices. Each month, a new set of contracts is offered. Contract 
liquidation values are determined by rates of return or changes in. closing prices of the
. 
underlying stock measured from the third Friday of one month to the third Friday of the 
next month. Trade starts on Monday following the third Friday of the month. Trading 
halts when the liquidation value is determined. Rates of return on the underlying stock 
securities are adjusted for dividend payments. Rates of return on indices are not dividend­
adjusted. 
Iowa manages another set of markets, where the payoffs on the traded securities 
depend on political events, such as the outcome of presidential or parliamentary elections. 
These markets pre-date the ones that we are studying here. For an in-depth analysis of 
the political markets, see Forsythe, Nelson, Neumann and Wright [1992]. 
We investigate two sets of markets: the computer industry returns markets and the 
Microsoft price level markets. Four winner-take-all contracts are traded in the former. 
They pay one dollar depending on which underlying security had the highest return: 
Apple, IBM, Microsoft or the S&P500, respectively. Contracts written on losers expire 
worthless. Hence, these contracts are Arrow-Debreu securities written on a state space 
determined by the returns of the aforementioned stocks and the S&P500 index. In the 
Microsoft markets, two contracts are traded. One, the "High" contract, pays a dollar 
when Microsoft's next month closing price is above a predetermined cut-off level. The 
other one, the "Low," pays one dollar in the complementary state. The cut-off level 
is determined by the exercise price of the closest-at-the-money, exchange-traded option 
(CBOE) on Microsoft. 
The ·trading mechanism of the Iowa Electronic Market is the computerized double 
auction. Participation extends beyond the University of Iowa (the market is internet­
based) , but is restricted to investors with academic affiliations. In addition to trading 
individual contracts, a "market" portfolio can be purchased and sold. This is a unit 
portfolio which bundles all contracts in a set of markets, and, hence, guarantees a unit 
payout. It can be purchased from or sold to the system for a unit price, or bought/sold 
in the market (the latter requires, however, that there be quotes in all contracts) . 
We limit our attention to daily closing prices, which are defined to be the last trans­
action price before midnight, or, if no transactions took place, the previous closing price. 
Notice that closing prices, and, hence, returns, on complementary contracts are nonsyn­
chronous. This implies, among other things, that the closing prices do not necessarily 
add up to one, even if a bundle of complementary contracts guarantees a unit payoff, 
and that returns are not colinear. Let us look at the data to gauge the importance of 
nonsynchrony. 
Table 1 displays some descriptive price and volume statisties. Figure 1 plots the price 
g 
paths for the two Microsoft securities over four sample months. Table 1 lists the average 
and standard deviation of the absolute deviation of the sum of the prices of comple­
mentary securities from one. The numbers are sizeable, indicating that nonsynchrony is 
a serious problem. It also means that the returns on conplementary securities are not 
necessarily colinear, a fact that we will exploit in our tests. The lack of colinearity is also 
apparent from Figure 1: if synchronous, the price paths of the two Microsoft securities 
should be perfectly symmetric with respect to a line through $0.50 .  They are not. 
Table 1 also documents substantial positive skewness and extreme kurtosis in the dis­
tribution of returns. Readers familiar with derivatives markets (such as the winner-take­
all markets we are studying here) will not be surprised. The kurtosis is also apparent in 
Figure 1: the history for the 10/95 Microsoft High contract (which pays $1 if Microsoft's 
price increased from September 1995) includes a day (10/17 /95) when the price jumped 
from $0.024 to $0.455, a return of 1,796%! The skewness is reflected in the surprisingly 
high average daily return. See Table 1. The averages are less than two standard errors 
from zero, however, except in the pooled sample. 
4 Testing Rationality of Learning 
Results 3 and 6 of Section 2 demonstrate that one can use the modified return (where 
the end-of-period price is used to deflate payoffs) of winning securities to test for the 
rationality of learning. Those results solely depended on agents' correctly applying the 
rules of conditional probability (Bayes' law) , and not on the initial beliefs, which could 
be arbitrarily biased. 
Let us look at the returns and modified returns on winning securities in the Iowa 
market data described in the previous section. Because of Results 2 and 5 in Section 2, 
we expect the traditional return to be positive on average. This contrasts with the 
modified return, which should be zero on average. 
We computed average daily returns and modified returns for each month-long price 
history and then tested whether the average (of this average) was zero across the monthly 
histories. Since the dataset covers sixteen months, we will have a cross-section of sixteen 
averages for each individual set of markets (the Microsoft markets and the computer 
industry markets separately) and thirty-two averages when we pool both sets of markets. 
The outcomes in the cross-section can safely be assumed to be independent. 
We can also loo"k _at_the securities witn payoffs comp1ementary to those of the losing 
securities. Of course, the complementary securities are winners as well. Complementary 
securities can easily be created by purchasing the market portfolio from the system for 
$1 and selling one traded security. We take the price of the complementary security to 
be the value of this portfolio. In the Microsoft case, each security is the complement 
of the other, so that results are expected to be similar to those obtained from actually 
traded winning securities. Discrepancies will arise, however, because securities trade 
10 
nonsynchronously. In the computer industry markets, the complementary security to, 
say, Apple, is the one that pays $1 if any other security than Apple wins. 
In the computer industry markets, there will be correlation across monthly histories 
of complementary securities that traded simultaneously, i.e. , during the same month. 
The results that we are about to report do not correct for this. When we attempted to 
address the problem (mainly by running Seemingly Unrelated Regressions), the results 
were not altered qualitatively. 
Table 2 displays the average of the time series daily return average, as ·well as its 
standard error. In all cases is this average more than two standard errors above zero, 
corroborating Results 2 and 5. Table 2 also lists results for the average of the time 
series daily modified return average. It is always within two standard errors from zero, 
in accordance with Results 3 and 6.3 
In Table 1, we documented extreme skewness and kurtosis in the distribution of 
returns. One wonders to what extent these affect the inference in Table 2. Therefore, 
Table 2 also display the skewness and excess kurtosis of the month-long averages. The 
values are far more acceptable, rendering credibility to our results. This is certainly so 
for the modified returns. 
We can conclude provisionally that learning in the Iowa markets is rational: there are 
no biases in the modified returns of winning securities. 
In fact, Results 3 and 6 are stronger than this simple test of the average modified 
return may indicate. For learning to be rational, the average modified return of winning 
securities ought to be unpredictable from any past information. We can test this in two 
ways. 
First, we can correlate the modified return with past information, by computing the 
average of the modified return times, say, the lagged price, or the lagged price squared. 
Second, we can simply regress the modified return onto lagged information, e.g., the 
lagged price. 
Let us discuss results from the first strategy. We compute monthly averages of 
Xt+IPt 
and 
·.'4;=-1·�)2, 
and test whether they are zero across the months. Of course, we continue to limit our 
attention to winners. For comparison, we also report results for monthly averages based 
3We only report standard errors and whether the statistic is 1.8 or 2 standard errors from zero. In 
order to avoid unnecessary controversy, we refrain from attaching a specific p-level to the estimates. We 
allow the reader to use his or her favorite distributional theory to determine what the corresponding 
p-level is. 
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on the traditional return, i.e., from 
and 
Table 3 reports the results. In no case is the monthly average of Xt+lPt or Xt+i (Pt)2 
significantly different from zero, supporting Bayesian Equilibrium. This contrasts wlth 
the averages of rt+1Pt and Tt+i (Pt)2, which are all significantly positive. Taking the results 
of Tables 2 and 3 together, the modified return of winning contracts is not predictable 
from past information embedded in the price level. 
The second strategy, whereby we project the (modified) return onto the beginning­
of-period price using OLS, deserves more discussion. Many researchers, starting with 
Keim and Stambaugh (1986) , have found that stock returns are negatively related to the 
beginning-of-period price. For winners, however, the projection of the modified return 
onto the lagged price should produce insignificant results, at least if prices are set in a 
Bayesian Equilibrium. We verify this for the Iowa markets. 
W hen plainly projecting the modified return on the lagged price, however, the error 
exhibits substantial heteroscedasticity: its variance is far higher for low price levels. This 
obviously affects the inference. It turns out that there is a simple way to correct for the 
heteroscedasticity in the error term, namely, by regressing the modified return times the 
lagged price (xt+iPt) onto the lagged price (Pt) · 
Table 4 reports results of this alternative projection. For comparison purposes, we 
also display results for OLS projections of the traditional return multiplied by the lagged 
price (i.e., the price change) onto the lagged price. The contrast between the highly 
significant coefficients for the traditional return against the small and insignificant ones 
for the modified return is striking. As before, Bayesian Equilibrium (or rational learning) 
is supported. 
For space considerations, we do not report results for the securities that are comple­
mentary to the losers. They do not lead to different inference. The interested reader can 
obtain the results for these securities from the authors. 
5 Testing For Rational Expectations 
As is well-known, REE can readily be tested by verifying (in-sample) predictability of 
returns using past information. We must not, however, condition on future information, 
such as, e.g., the eventual payoff on a security. In the previous section, we did so, because 
the tests were inspired by Results 3 and 6. In contrast, tests of rational expectations are 
based on Result 1, where one conditions out (i.e., averages across) eventual outcomes. 
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We initially tested REE by projecting returns onto lagged prices. As with the pro­
jections leading to Table 4, however, we discovered pronounced heteroscedasticity in the 
error term: its variance decreased with the price level. Again, a simple transformation 
purged the error of heteroscedasticity, namely, multiplication of the return by the lagged 
price. Of course, this means that the regressand became sTmply the change in the price 
over the subsequent day. 
Figure 2 provides a scatter plot of daily price changes against lagged prices for t}J.e 
Microsoft contracts. T.he negative trend stands out. Also, there is little evidence of 
heteroscedasticity as a function of the price level. 
Table 5 reports the results of the OLS projections of price changes onto lagged prices. 
The negative trend apparent in Figure 2 translates into significantly positive intercepts 
and negative slope coefficients. It is interesting to note that this is precisely what has 
been observed for U.S. stock returns as well (see, e.g., Keim and Stambaugh [1986]) . 
The evidence in Table 5 leads us to refute REE at high confidence levels. Because we 
concluded in the previous section that closing prices in the Iowa markets reflect rational 
learning, however, we cannot attribute this rejection to over-reaction (the explanation 
usually advanced for this phenomenon in the stock markets). It must be agents' beliefs. 
They are biased, in violation of one of the assumptions behind rational expectations. 
In what sense are beliefs biased? A closer investigation of the data revealed the fol­
lowing. Take the Microsoft markets, for instance. The Microsoft High contract matured 
in the money twelve times out of sixteen (months) . This seems to indicate that chances 
for Microsoft High to pay off $1 are 75%, which would lead us to assign a value of $0. 75 at 
the beginning of trading. We noticed, however, that the first closing price for Microsoft 
High was often substantially different from $0.75. The deviation for the 9/95 contract, 
for instance, was more than $0.30 (see Figure 1) .  
By themselves, these deviations from what we consider · to be a fair value for the 
Microsoft High contract may merely be evidence of the superior information that markets 
possess over us, or they may reflect that the Microsoft High contract does not always 
start trading at the money. However, together with the negative relationship between 
price levels and subsequent returns, the deviations in the initial Microsoft High prices 
from fair value seem to indicate that Iowans started out with more extreme priors than 
can be justified ex post. Beliefs subsequently reverted back to some more acceptable level. 
Unfortunately, we observe only sixteen predictions. The forecasts reflected in the 
initial closing prices did not deviate sufficiently to be able to make formal statements 
about the extent to which agents' beliefs were biased. 
In this respect, it is worth emphasizing that a comparison between the negative 
correlation between price levels and subsequent price changes (documented in Table 5) ,  
on the one hand, and the absence of correlation between the modified return and lagged 
prices for winning securities (documented in Table 4) , on the other hand, did allow us 
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to conclude that initial beliefs must have been biased. It underscores the power of our 
methodology. 
As a final note, we should caution the reader against overinterpreting our evidence 
against rational expectations. Return measures do not always accurately reflect potential 
profitability. Our returns are computed on the basis of transaction prices. Transactions · 
could take place either at the bid or at the ask. If today's closing transactions took place 
at the bid, and tomorrow's at the ask, the return one computes from the closing prices 
measures incorrectly the payoff on a strategy of purchasing the security at today's close 
and selling at tomorrow's close.4 
Among other things, the regression results reported in Table 5 could be affected by 
this bid-ask bounce, if closes with a low price predominantly take place at the bid. The 
subsequent return would be biased upward. This bias would translate into a negative 
correlation between the error in the regression of returns onto previous closing prices and 
the regressor. The OLS slope coefficient would be negatively biased. Absent quote data, 
however, we have no way to tell how severe this problem is. 
Still, it is important to appreciate that if bid-ask bounce biased the regressions with 
the traditional return as regressor, it ought to have affected the ones with the modified 
return as regressand as well. Tables 3 and 4 documented, however, that the results 
for the latter conform nicely to the. theory. This makes our evidence against rational 
expectations less ambivalent. 
6 Conclusion 
We cannot find any predictability in return sequences of winning securities in the Iowa 
experimental markets where the payoffs are defined with respect to U.S. exchange-listed 
stock. The returns were suitably modified to adjust for the selection bias caused by 
our focusing on securities that matured in the money. Since these modified returns are 
unpredictable if agents correctly apply the rules of conditional probability, we conclude 
that we cannot reject that market prices in Iowa reflect rational learning. 
In contrast, we find evidence of in-sample predictability of returns, in the form of a 
negative correlation between the daily price change and the level of the previous closing 
price. Since in-sample predictability violates rational expectations but agents appear to 
have correctly implemented Bayes' law, we conclude that their priors must have been bi­
ased. Under rational expectations, t'he priors had to coindde with the actual distribution 
of outcomes. 
W hat does this mean in terms of the traditional notion of market efficiency (Fama 
[ 1970, 1991]) , i.e., for a newcomer's ability to "make money" ? Based on the evidence 
4Several papers in the finance literature point out the potential biases from using transaction prices, 
starting with Blume and Stambaugh [1983]. 
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reported here, a newcomer should refrain from betting against the Iowa markets. There 
is no money to be made from mistakes against the rules of conditional probability. Still, 
the newcomer may want to trade because her priors differ from those of the market. The 
bottom line is: the marginal bet in the Iowa market is pure speculation. 
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N: 
Daily return: 
Average Daily 
Volume (Units): 
Measure of 
N onsynchrony: 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
All Microsoft 
Markets Markets 
2380 795 
Average 0. 083 0 .081 
St. dev. 1.563 1.169 
Skewness 27.7 16.8 
Kurtosis 980 325 
80. 0 
Average 0.006 
St. Dev. 0 .049 
Computer 
Industry 
Markets 
1585 
0.084 
1.728 
28.2 
953 
266. 3 
0. 019 
0. 062 
Remarks: The information is based on daily closing prices from the Iowa Experimen­
tal Markets, 8/95 till 12/96 (16 months) . The closing price is the price of the last 
transaction or, if no transaction took place during the day, the previous closing price. 
Sometimes, contracts continued to be traded after their payoff became known; the cor­
responding observations were deleted. Also, the following were discarded because they 
clearly represented aberrations: All computer markets closing prices on 8/28/95 and 
8/29/95; Microsoft Low closing price on 5/20/96; Computer industry markets closing 
prices on 6/20/96. N denotes sample size. Nonsynchrony is measured by the average 
absolute deviation of the sum of the closing prices of complementary contracts from unity. 
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Table 2 
Analysis Of Payoffs On Winning Contracts 
All Microsoft Computer 
Markets Markets Industry 
Markets 
Winners N: 32 16 16 
r: Average 0.115** 0. 097** 0 .173** 
(0. 030) (0.037) (0.047) 
Skewness 2.4 3.5 2.0 
Kurtosis 9.9 16.2 9.4 
x: Average -0. 033 -0.032 -0.035 
(0.022) ( 0.022) (0.038) 
Skewness -1.7 -1.6 -1.6 
Kurtosis 5.8 4.5 5.1 
Complements N: 64 16 48 
to Losers r: Average 0. 046** 0. 086** 0. 032** 
(0. 008) (0.026) (0. 006) 
Skewness 4.0 3.2 2.2 
Kurtosis 25.2 14.7 8.8 
x: Average -0.016 -0. 028 -0. 011 
(0.010) ( 0. 020) (0.011) 
Skewness -3.9 -1.4 -4.9 
Kurtosis 21.8 3.7 30. 0  
Remarks: N denotes sample size. r denotes the average across all month-long histories 
of the time series average daily traditional return. x denotes the average across all month­
long histories of the time series average daily modified return, where the payoff is divided 
by the end-of-period closing price. Standard error in parentheses. * and ** indicate that 
the statistic is more than 1.8 and 2 standard errors from zero, respectively. The closing 
prices of complements to losers is obtained by subtracting the closing price of a loser 
from the price at which the market portfolio can be bought from the system (i.e., $1). 
In the Microsoft case, the price history of the complements to the losers is not identical 
to that of the winners, because of nonsynchrony. 
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Table 3 
Analysis Of Payoffs On Winning Contracts: 
Correlation With Lagged Information · 
All Microsoft Computer 
Markets Markets Industry 
Markets 
Lagged N: 32 16 16 
Price . rp: Average 0. 086** 0.097** 0.035** 
(0. 004) (0. 004) (0. 007) 
Skewness 1.1 -0. 4  0 .9 
Kurtosis 6.2 2.4 5. 4 
xp: Average -0. 011 -0. 019 -0. 003 
(0.008) ( 0 . 013) (0. 009) 
Skewness -1.8 -2.3 -0.2  
Kurtosis 8. 3 8. 4 3.4 
Lagged N: 32 16 16 
Price rp2: Average 0.009** 0 .006** 0. 013** 
Squared (0. 002) (0. 003) (0. 004) 
Skewness 0.6 -0.8 1.5 
Kurtosis . 5.3 2. 4 5.9 
xp2: Average -0. 005 -0. 011 0.000 
(0. 005) ( 0.008) (0. 005) 
Skewness -2. 4 -2.5 -0. 0  
Kurtosis 12.0 10.3 3. 6 
Remarks: N denotes sample size. rp denotes the average across all month-long histories 
of the time series average daily traditional return multiplied by the lagged price level. 
xp denotes the average across all month-long histories of the time series average daily 
modified return multiplied by the lagged price level. rp2 denotes the average across all 
month-long histories of the time series average daily traditional return multiplied by the 
square of the lagged price level. xp2 denotes the average across all month-long histories 
of the time series average daily modified return multiplied by the square of the lagged 
price level. Standard error in parentheses. * and ** indicate that the statistic is more 
than 1. 8 and 2 standard errors from zero, respectively. 
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N 
Intercept 
Slope 
R2 
Table 4 
Analysis Of Payoffs On Winning Contracts: 
OLS Projections Of Returns T imes Lagged Prices 
Onto Lagged Prices 
All Markets Microsoft Markets Computer Industry 
Markets 
Return Modified Return Modified Return Modified 
Return Return Return 
601 601 299 299 301 301 
0.044** -0.014 0. 056** -0. 032 0. 034** -0.011 
(0. 010 )  (0.014) (0.018) (0.030 ) (0.013) (0. 014) 
-0.044** 0.003 -0.067** 0.021 -0.015 0.011 
(0.017) (0. 024) (0.026) (0. 045) (0. 028) (0.031) 
0. 011 0.000 0.021 0.001 0. 001 0 .000 
Remarks: To compute the modified return, the payoff is  divided by the end-of-period 
price instead of the beginning-of-period price. N denotes sample size. * and ** indicate 
that the statistic is more than 1.8 and 2 standard errors from zero, respectively. 
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N 
Intercept 
Slope 
Rz 
Table 5 
OLS Projections Of Changes In Prices 
Onto Lagged Price Levels 
All Markets Microsoft Markets Computer Industry 
Markets 
1792 591 1200 
0.050** 0.058** 0.048** 
(0.006) (0.013) (0.007) 
-0.053** -0.069** -0.048** 
(0.009) (0.019) (0.010) 
0.020 0.022 0.019 
Remarks: N denotes sample size. * and ** indicate that the statistic is more than 1.8 
and 2 standard errors from zero, respectively. 
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Figure 1: Time series plots of daily closing prices for contracts Microsoft High (bold 
line) and Microooft .Low. (-0.ashoo J.ine� . .  .Qne...,,ffi-Onth histories,fm.:.fou,r .expiration months 
are shown: 9/95 (month m5i) , 12/95 (month m51), 1/96 (month m6a) and 6/96 (month 
m6f ).  
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